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Abstract
Overwhelming evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that, in simple discrim-
ination tasks (determining what is louder, longer, brighter, or even which number
is larger) humans make more mistakes and decide more slowly when the stimuli are
closer along the relevant scale. We investigate to what extent these effects are rele-
vant for economic decisions. Strikingly, we find that even when there is an objectively
correct answer independently of attitudes toward risk, the same effects obtain as ex-
pected values become closer. Contrary to pure discrimination tasks, however, differ-
ences in payoff-independent numerical magnitudes play a minor role. When correct
answers depend on subjective attitudes toward risk, differences in expected values
fail to explain error rates. The gradual effects on error rates and response times
subsist but are instead explained by cardinal differences in independently-estimated
subjective utilities (“strength of preference”). This is in agreement with assump-
tions typically made (but seldom validated) in random utility models. We conclude
that the gradual effects on choice found in cognitive discrimination paradigms are
very much present in economic choices, but depend on purely economic variables.
An implication is that even if correct economic choices can be seen as ordinal, actual
economic choices carry a cardinal component.
JEL Classification: D9 · D01 · D81
Keywords: Strength of preference · Choice difficulty · Stochastic choice · Risk
attitude
Working Paper. This is an author-generated version of a research manuscript which
is circulated exclusively for the purpose of facilitating scientific discussion. All rights
reserved. The final version of the article might differ from this one.
∗The authors thank Ernst Fehr, Nick Netzer, Antonio Rangel, and Michael Woodford for helpful
comments.
†Corresponding author: carlos.alos-ferrer@econ.uzh.ch
1
1 Introduction
Errors are everywhere. Economics has by now embraced the view that economic choices
are subject to noise (e.g., McFadden, 2001). Research in stochastic choice has provided
extensive evidence that human beings often make different choices even when repeat-
edly confronted with the same set of options1 (e.g., Tversky, 1969; Camerer, 1989; Hey
and Orme, 1994; Ballinger and Wilcox, 1997; Agranov and Ortoleva, 2017). There is,
however, no universally-accepted view on the origins and determinants of noise or er-
rors in economic decision making. How often do economic agents make mistakes, and
what does the number of mistakes depend on? These questions are important both for
positive and normative reasons. On the one hand, forecasting economic choices requires
accurate models of decision errors, beyond the simple assertion that people indeed do
make mistakes. On the other hand, predicting the effects of economic policies and evalu-
ating their consequences is only possible if the consequences of human errors in response
to them are understood. Indeed, large individual error rates are reflected in significant
behavioral heterogeneity and can cause potentially large welfare losses at the aggregate
level (e.g., Choi et al., 2014; Harrison and Ng, 2016; Alekseev et al., 2019).2
The key question is whether error rates are associated with directly or indirectly
measurable economic variables. To understand the sources of mistakes (or stochastic
choice) in economic decisions, however, it is useful to briefly step back and examine
evidence from the cognitive sciences (chiefly cognitive psychology and neuroscience) on
tasks which are significantly simpler than the ones proper of economics. In the domain
of psychophysics, decades of research have concentrated on perceptual discrimination
tasks, where two stimuli are presented and human participants are asked to estimate
which one scores higher along an objective scale, for instance which of two sounds is
louder, which of two lights is brighter, or which of two lines is longer. In such simple
tasks, there is an objective, direct measure of choice difficulty: choices become gradually
harder as the difference between the stimuli becomes smaller (along the objective scale).
There are two firmly-established stylized facts in this literature. The first is that the
percentage of correct choices is strictly decreasing with choice difficulty, that is, error
rates are larger when stimuli are more similar (Laming, 1985; Klein, 2001; Wichmann
and Hill, 2001). The second is that choices are slower as choice difficulty increases, that
is, response times are larger when the stimuli are more similar (Dashiell, 1937; Moyer
and Landauer, 1967). This second fact is commonly taken as evidence that the effect on
error rates derives from basic (gradual) neural mechanisms in the human brain. That is,
1“Common experience suggests, and experiment confirms, that a person does not always make the
same choice when faced with the same options, even when the circumstances of choice seem in all relevant
aspects to be the same.” (Davidson and Marschak, 1959).
2If a normative view is adopted where (except for knife-edge indifference cases) only one choice is
considered correct (or consistent with underlying preferences), the statement that choice is stochastic is
equivalent to the empirically-ubiquitous observation of positive error rates. It is in this sense that we
speak of “errors” in this work. This is also in line with a positive-economics view, where one aims to
understand the extent to which economic decision makers will deviate from choices deemed “rational.”
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decisions might derive from gradual, noisy processes of internal evidence accumulation,
which are more error-prone and time-consuming if the quantities that need to be teased
apart are closer (Shadlen and Kiani, 2013; Shadlen and Shohamy, 2016).
In this work, we ask the question of whether these gradual effects are relevant for
economic choices and, if so, which economic variables do determine them. This question
is obviously important for conceptual reasons, as the phenomena we discuss imply a
cardinal effect of economic variables on choices, as opposed to the classical, purely-
ordinal view of preferences. Providing an empirical demonstration of the postulated
effects, however, is also important in view of the recent literature. Such effects would
be an implication of any model assuming that choice frequencies reflect an efficient
use of limited representational resources in the human mind, as for instance recent
models of rational inattention (Caplin and Dean, 2015; Mateˇjka and McKay, 2015) or
optimal sparsity (Gabaix et al., 2006; Gabaix, 2014). Also, if certain differences among
alternatives are more salient than others (Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2012, 2013),
they will naturally attract more attention, resulting in reduced error rates.
However, studying the dependence of error rates on underlying economic variables
is far from straightforward, for two reasons which we will elaborate on below. The first
is that it is by no means clear what the gradual effects predicted by psychology and
neuroscience should depend on for economic choices, where a natural scale as weight,
brightness, or length is usually not part of the problem’s formulation, and utilities are
neither directly observable nor objective. The second is that, even if one glosses over the
former point, and although gradual effects transforming utility differences in economic
choices are often assumed in applied economics (Anderson, Thisse and De Palma, 1992;
McFadden, 2001; Moffatt, 2015), the estimation method might often create apparent
regularities where none exists, hence obscuring the actual origin of the key regularities.
The first problem is an obvious one. In a sense, and with apologies to those fields,
psychophysicists and perceptual psychologists face easier problems than economists. It
is a priori not clear whether objectively-given scales might play the role of weight or
length for economic decisions, or even for some of them. For instance, on the basis of the
available evidence, a good case could be made for numerical magnitudes, independently
of whether they are payoff-relevant or not. Results by Moyer and Landauer (1967) and
Dehaene, Dupoux and Mehler (1990) (see also Dehaene, 1992; Dehaene et al., 2008)
show that the gradual effects on error rates and response times exist even when humans
are asked to discriminate among single-digit numbers. That is (astonishingly), people
make more mistakes (and take longer to decide) when asked whether 6 is larger than
5 than when asked whether 9 is larger than 2. This is compatible with evidence from
electroencephalography (EEG), which suggests that the neural representations of num-
bers vary in a continuous, gradual way with numerical distance (Spitzer, Waschke and
Summerfield, 2017). Recently, Khaw, Li and Woodford (2018) have suggested that the
mere imprecise representation of numerical magnitudes along these lines may explain the
large estimates of risk aversion which are typically observed in laboratory experiments
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in economics. Given that many economic tasks come with a numerical framing, it is
necessary to tackle the question of which is the (most) relevant dimension underlying
possible gradual effects on economic choices.
Although error rates might indeed be affected by the imprecise representation of
observational variables as e.g. numerical magnitudes, this is unlikely to be the only de-
terminant of errors. More natural candidates, painting a less bleak picture of human
rationality, are related to economic gains, as is the case of expected value or (estimated)
expected utility. Inspired by models from psychology (Thurstone, 1927), random util-
ity models, as pioneered by Marschak (1960) and McFadden (2001), assume that errors
depend on underlying (unobservable) utility differences. However, very few studies have
actually empirically demonstrated a monotonic relation between error rates and differ-
ences in underlying utilities. A notable exception is the early study of Mosteller and
Nogee (1951), which used utilities estimated through an interpolation procedure. An
added difficulty is that both in the empirical work of Mosteller and Nogee (1951) (and
other experiments), as well as in theoretical random utility models an error is defined as
a choice which does not maximize utility, that is, there is no ex ante definition of error
independent of the (estimated or assumed) utility.
This leads us straight to the second problem. At least since McFadden (2001),
most applied work in discrete choice microeconomics assumes a gradual relation between
underlying utility differences and choice probabilities, often with a specific logit or probit
form, in order to parametrically estimate the utilities themselves. While this approach is
invaluable to compare the fit of different utility-based models of choice and has delivered
important insights, it is not appropriate to test the basic hypothesis that gradual effects
exist, or to pin down measurable determinants thereof. To drive this point home, we
constructed a dataset by simulating fictitious subjects who made completely random
decisions among alternative risky choices. We then treated the dataset as if it would
come from actual decision makers and used a standard fitting approach estimating an
alleged risk propensity, assuming that errors depend on utility differences. Specifically,
we assumed a CARA utility function and heteroskedastic errors with a logit form, as
commonly done in the literature (e.g., Moffatt, 2015); for more details on the estimation
procedures, see Section 4.2 below. Plotting choice frequencies against the estimated
utility differences yields a regular sigmoidal curve (as in any logit or probit model), which
creates the appearance of order (and gradual effects arising from utility differences) for
the nonsensical dataset. This is shown on the left-hand panel of Figure 1. Actually, this
appearance is a mere artifice of the method, as can be shown by estimating utility out
of sample, i.e., using part of the choices for estimation purposes and plotting the rest of
the choices against the resulting estimated utility differences. Specifically, we estimated
individual risk attitudes using a random parameter model (Loomes and Sugden, 1995,
1998), which in particular does not assume a logit form for error terms (again, see section
4 for details on the estimation). We used even-number choices to estimate a utility which
we used to plot data from odd-numbered choices, and vice versa. This approach shows
4
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Figure 1: Analysis of a dataset of random, simulated choices. Left-hand panel: Choices
as function of expected utility difference using a standard, within procedure. An appear-
ance of order and gradual effects of expected utility differences on error rates emerges,
even though no regularity is present in the data. Right-hand panel: The same choices as
function of expected utility difference using an out-of-sample procedure. No regularity
can be identified. Gray areas indicate 95% binomial proportion confidence intervals.
that there is no actual regularity in the dataset, as depicted on the right-hand panel of
Figure 1. We conclude that structural models where utility is estimated can mistakenly
create an appearance of gradual effects, and hence direct tests are needed.
In this work, we aim to test and clarify the dependence of error rates (the variable
of interest) in decisions under risk on economic variables. We attack the problem on
three fronts. First, we conduct an experiment (Experiment 1) with normatively-correct
answers (but high error rates) where the explanatory variable can be determined in
advance. This is made possible by employing a binary-choice gambling task where
the winning probability or, equivalently, expected value, is an unequivocal, objectively
measurable indicator of choice difficulty. In this study, the definition of error can be made
ex ante, independently of any estimation of utility, simply because correct responses are
independent of attitudes toward risk. In this way, we commit to the explanatory variable
before collecting the data, and utility estimation plays no role. The task is simple in the
sense that rational decision makers could “figure it out” with relative ease, as is the
case of many problems in judgment and decision making, where an optimal decision
under risk has to be made on the basis of individual beliefs. We find a significant
fraction of errors (above 25%), and we demonstrate that far from being pure noise,
error rates stand in a clear monotonic relation with differences in expected value. That
is, we demonstrate the existence of gradual effects of an objective economic distance
among alternatives and error rates. The design also allows us to test for dependence on
payoff-irrelevant numerical effects as in Moyer and Landauer (1967), and we find that
there is indeed some relation, but it is a second-order phenomenon compared with the
dependence on expected-value differences. This delivers a first, objective confirmation
of psychophysical, gradual effects in decision making under risk arising from economic
variables.
5
Second, we conduct a different experiment (Experiment 2) using a betting paradigm
where whether a decision is correct or not depends on individual attitudes toward risk,
as is the case for most lottery-choice tasks. Rather than fitting the data to an estimated
utility, we employ an out-of-sample estimation procedure excluding any artifices arising
from the estimation method. Again, we find a monotonic relation, with larger error rates
arising when the differences in the expected utility of the options are smaller. In con-
trast, the dependence on expected value differences is considerably weaker. That is, we
demonstrate that the gradual effects on choice observed in psychophysics can be readily
found in standard economic tasks, but they will in general arise from a subjective eco-
nomic distance which arises from integrated, unobservable variables (“utility”). Further,
economic distance (subjective or objective) can then be considered a cardinal measure
of “strength of preference,” because its cardinal magnitude determines a measurable,
continuous variable (error rates).
Third, we conduct an additional, confirmatory test. In both experiments, we col-
lect data from response times as an independent variable, which in particular plays no
role for the estimation of underlying utilities. Psychophysics predicts a robust relation,
with decisions where stimuli are closer being slower. We find this relation in both ex-
periments. In Experiment 1, response times increase as differences in expected value
decrease, but they are relatively unaffected by payoff-irrelevant numerical magnitudes.
In Experiment 2, the analysis of response times confirms that differences in underlying
utilities are a better candidate for economic distance (which replaces the choice diffi-
culty of psychophysics) than differences in expected value (or numerical magnitudes).
In both cases, the relation with response times (again a measurable, continuous variable)
confirms the cardinal content of economic distance.
Taken together, our evidence demonstrates that the psychophysical effects found
in the cognitive sciences are indeed very relevant for economic decisions under risk, but
they depend more on economic variables than on perceptual or numerical ones. Decision-
irrelevant factors (numerical magnitudes) influence error rates, but they play a secondary
role in comparison with purely-economic variables. In settings where objectively-optimal
answers can be derived from (correct) beliefs, it is possible to give an exogenous definition
of errors, which in turn allows for a straightforward observation of the link between eco-
nomic distance and error rates (in particular, one which is free of estimation problems).
When risk attitudes play a role, the explanatory variable is a subjective, integrated one
capturing “strength of preference,” which needs to be estimated. This result validates
the ideas and assumptions behind random utility models. Further, the relation to re-
sponse times shows that the effects are more than “as if” accounts of decision making
and have their origin in brain processes of a gradual nature, as assumed e.g. by evidence
accumulation models (Ratcliff, 1978; Fudenberg, Strack and Strzalecki, 2018).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature.
Sections 3 and 4 discuss Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. The analysis of response
times is conducted in the last subsections within those sections. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
Our work is related to long-standing problems in economics and to several strands of
the recent literature in economics. The study of stochastic choice and random utility
models, going back to classic contributions as those of Debreu (1958) and Luce (1959),
has endorsed the view that utilities should be understood as reflecting choice probabil-
ities, in direct opposition with the neoclassical view that they reflect preferences of an
exclusively ordinal nature (Hicks and Allen, 1934). The proliferation of experimental
data showing the stochastic nature of economic choice has led to increased attention on
theoretical models of stochastic choice in the recent years (e.g. Manzini and Mariotti,
2014; Mateˇjka and McKay, 2015; Fudenberg and Strzalecki, 2015; Apestegu´ıa, Ballester
and Lu, 2017; Apestegu´ıa and Ballester, 2018). In game theory, models of stochastic
(logit) choice based on observable payoffs and unobservable idiosyncratic shocks have
given rise to new equilibrium concepts as quantal response equilibria (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995; Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2005). In microeconometrics, models of discrete
choice (Anderson, Thisse and De Palma, 1992) have become standard for fitting experi-
mental data and recovering underlying utility functions, frequently under “Fechnerian”
assumptions (Fechner, 1860) which postulate a logit or probit form for error terms (see
Moffatt, 2015, for a detailed overview). Those models assume exact functional forms
mapping differences in utilities to error terms, which are highly valuable as structural
assumptions but are in general not directly tested. In stark contrast, Alo´s-Ferrer, Fehr
and Netzer (2018) have recently shown that certain properties of the empirical distri-
bution of response times allow to recover the underlying preferences in random utility
models without imposing any substantive assumptions on the distribution of random
terms.
To the best of our knowledge, the first study to point at a connection between utility
differences and choice frequencies was the inspiring experiment of Mosteller and Nogee
(1951) on poker dice gaming, which aimed to “test the validity of the construct” rep-
resented by (expected) utility. Their analysis included illustrations which suggested a
sigmoidal relation between utility differences and choice frequencies, although, as the
authors admitted, those were at the individual level and cherry-picked among all experi-
mental participants. While suggestive, their illustrations were not a test for the presence
of gradual effects (and were actually not meant to be), because their utility functions
were constructed exclusively out of observed indifferences. For instance, although their
illustrations map zero utility difference to 50 percent choice frequency, “this finding
was built into the expected utilities by the construction leading to the utility curves”
(Mosteller and Nogee, 1951, p. 202).
Conceptually, our work is also related to the study of Khaw, Li and Woodford (2018),
who carried out an experiment on risky choice where participants chose between a sure
amount and lotteries with a single non-zero outcome and a fixed probability of winning
varying amounts (that is, the winning probability was identical for all choices). By vary-
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ing the sure amount and the lottery outcome, Khaw, Li and Woodford (2018) explored
the reaction of choice frequencies to changes in payoffs and argued that the data could
be explained assuming an imprecise internal representation of numerical magnitudes, in
line with Moyer and Landauer (1967) and Dehaene (1992). Hence, their work speaks
in favor of a direct effect of numerical magnitudes in error rates. However, by design,
their numerical magnitudes stand in a monotonic relation to payoffs, and hence in their
data it is not possible to disentangle the effects of numerical magnitudes and the effects
of expected values (or utilities). In our experiments, different numerical magnitudes are
associated with the same expected payoffs and vice versa, allowing us to study the effects
separately.
The cardinal effects derived from a strength-of-preference account might also be
helpful to improve our understanding of standard behavioral phenomena. One example
is the asymmetric dominance or “decoy” effect, where the addition of a dominated option
shifts the choice frequencies in a previous pair in favor of the option dominating the added
one. Su¨ru¨cu¨, Djawadi and Recker (2019) point out that this effect might decrease with
the strength of preference among the two original options, i.e. might be strong enough
to overturn a weak preference but not a relatively strong one. Soltani, De Martino
and Camerer (2012) find within-subject decoy effects to be increasing with the distance
between the decoy and the original options, derived as a difference in estimated utilities.
While these contributions focus on the decoy effect and do not provide a direct test of
the gradual effects we are interest in, they do show that these effects are both plausible
and consequential in economic contexts.
Although our main variable of interest are decision errors, we also examine response
times for two reasons. First, well-established effects in psychophysics encompass both
error rates and response times, hence the analogy would not be complete without the
latter. Second, while an explanation of error rates alone might be challenged as a pure
“as if” story, response times allow reasonable inferences on the actual decision processes
generating the errors. In this sense, our work is related to the small but growing literature
examining response times in economics (see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2018, for a recent
review). Chabris et al. (2009) studied intertemporal decisions and found a monotonic
relationship between response times and estimated utility differences (discount factors).
Alo´s-Ferrer et al. (2016) postulated a model of lottery choice and evaluation including a
relation between choice difficulty and response times to investigate the determinants of
the preference reversal phenomenon (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Grether and Plott,
1979; Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman, 1990). Other response-time studies in economics
include Wilcox (1993, 1994) and the web-based studies of Rubinstein (2007, 2013). On a
different front, Achtziger and Alo´s-Ferrer (2014) relied on response times to differentiate
different decision processes in a framework where intuitive reinforcement might conflict
with optimal decisions based on Bayesian updating of beliefs (see also Alo´s-Ferrer and
Ritschel, 2018).
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3 Experiment 1: Objective Domain
We first aim to demonstrate the gradual effects of “strength of preference” on error rates
in a domain where the variable influencing those effects is objectively given, and, as a
consequence, utility estimation plays no role. The task we employ is representative of
studies in the judgment and decision-making domain, where economic agents make de-
cisions under risk or uncertainty but there is an objectively-correct answer, for example
due to stochastic dominance. A prominent example is given by tasks involving updating
of previously-held beliefs (e.g. Grether, 1980, 1992; Charness and Levin, 2005; Achtziger
and Alo´s-Ferrer, 2014). We will rely on a simple gambling task with given probabili-
ties, which is designed with two objectives in mind. The first is that objectively-correct
decisions exist, independently of attitudes toward risk, and thus an exogenously-given
measure of the strength of preference is available. The second is that numerical differ-
ences (in a perceptual sense) can be disentangled from economic incentives, allowing us
to investigate both possible dimensions of choice difficulty.
3.1 Design and Procedures
The experiment was computerized and programmed in Psychopy (Peirce, 2007), a soft-
ware which ensures high precision in the measurement of response times. We recruited
N = 96 participants (54 females, age range 19 − 47, mean 24) using ORSEE (Greiner,
2015) at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research. Participants were university
students enrolled in fields other than psychology and economics. They were provided
with written instructions and answered five control questions before starting the task, to
ensure correct comprehension of the procedures and payment mechanism. Three partici-
pants were unable to understand the task and were excluded from the analysis. Subjects
were paid according to their performance in the experiment. Total earnings were the
sum of the earnings in the 160 trials plus a show-up fee of EUR 4. Sessions lasted around
60 minutes and the average payoff was EUR 16.45 (around USD 17.60 at the time of the
experiment).
The experimental task is as follows. Participants are confronted with three decks
of cards, a red one (Diamonds) and two black ones (Clubs and Spades), containing ten
cards each (numbered 1 to 10, see Figure 2). The participants’ task is to choose twice
from which of the two black decks a card should be randomly extracted from, and the
game’s objective is to beat a card extracted from the red deck with the black one. Each
trial starts with a participant choosing between the two (complete) black decks, but this
first choice is irrelevant for our purposes since at this point both decks are identical. It
is also unpaid (to avoid possible reinforcement or valence effects). The choice, however,
creates an asymmetry which is the essence of the task. After the first choice is made and
the first black card is extracted, that card remains on the table (there is no replacement).
A card is extracted from the red deck, and the participant is asked to choose between
the black decks a second time. This is the choice we are interested in. A (black) card
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Figure 2: Experiment 1. A trial starts with participants choosing between the black
decks. Consequently a black card is extracted from that deck and a red card is displayed.
No replacement happens after the first choice. Participants then choose again between
the black decks, and a card is extracted from the chosen deck. If the second extracted
black card is strictly larger than the red card, the participant wins, otherwise she loses.
is extracted from the chosen deck, and the participant received EUR 0.15 if and only if
that black card has a number strictly bigger than the red card, otherwise she receives
nothing. Subsequently, the trial ends, all cards are placed back in their decks, and
decks are reshuﬄed before a new repetition starts. Participants knew that trials were
independent, so the outcome as well as the cards displayed in one trial were unrelated
to those of subsequent trials. Each participant completed 160 of such trials.
After the first choice, one black deck has either one winning card less or one losing
card less. Hence, by design, there is an optimal decision pattern for the second choice,
which is to bet on the deck with a higher proportion of winning cards. That is, if the
first black card was smaller or equal than the red card, the participant should choose
the same deck, and if the first black card was strictly larger than the red card, the
participant should choose the other deck. In the example depicted in Figure 2, the red
card is a 5 and the first black card is a 4 (of spades), so the spades deck contains only
9 cards, 4 losing and 5 winning ones. The clubs deck still contains 10 cards, 5 losing
and 5 winning cards. Therefore the deck of spades contains 1 losing card less than the
untouched deck of clubs and the optimal choice is to choose it again. On the contrary,
if the first extracted black card had been strictly larger than the red card, the chosen
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deck contains 1 winning card less than the other one, and the optimal decision would be
to choose the untouched deck. Hence, independently of risk aversion, there is always a
normatively-correct decision for the second choice.
In spite of the fact that all choices are either objectively correct or objectively wrong,
some choices are “more correct” than others, because opportunity costs are different.
Let r, b1 ∈ {1, . . . , 10} be the red card and the first extracted black card, respectively.
Let pi0(r, b1) and pi
1(r, b1) be the probability of winning by choosing the same deck
or by shifting to the other deck, respectively. Then V (r, b1) =
∣∣pi0(r, b1)− pi1(r, b1)
∣∣
is the cardinal difference (distance) between the probability of winning by making the
correct choice and the probability of winning while making an error. Since participants
are paid only in case they win, up to a rescaling of monetary units this is also the
difference in expected values between a correct decision and an error. If r ≥ b1, one
obtains pi0(r, b1) = (10 − r)/9 and pi
1(r, b1) = (10 − r)/10. If r < b1, one obtains
pi0(r, b1) = (10− r − 1)/9 and pi
1(r, b1) = (10 − r)/10. Hence,
V (r, b1) =


(10 − r)/90 if r ≥ b1,
r/90 if r < b1.
By design, V (r, b1) assumes values in the set {1/90, 2/90, ..., 9/90}. These differences
in expected value indicate the opportunity cost of (not) choosing the right answer and
reflect how far away from “indifference” the participants were in every decision, and are
hence a natural measure for the “strength of preference.” Thus, we take V (r, b1) as the
potential driver for stochastic choice and refer to this magnitude as (objective) economic
distance.
The probabilities of winning by staying or switching, and the economic distance, are
monotonic functions of the numerical value of the red card. However, for computing
the optimal choice the only necessary information is the sign of the relation between
the first black card and the red card. That is, the actual magnitude of the difference
between the values of these two cards is economically inconsequential. However, Moyer
and Landauer (1967), Dehaene, Dupoux and Mehler (1990), and others have shown that,
in simple comparisons, errors do depend on the numerical differences between stimuli.
Therefore, we also contemplate the possibility that the distance between the numerical
values of the first black card and the red one influences choice frequencies (and response
times). There are ten possible distances between the two cards, ranging from 0 to 9. We
refer to this magnitude as the numerical distance.
To ensure enough variability in the stimuli, the set of initial stimuli (first black card
and red card) was predetermined and pseudorandomized. Furthermore, the red card was
never a 10, since in this case winning would be impossible, hence the choice would be
inconsequential (the instructions did not claim that the red card was randomly selected,
since the procedure by which it was selected was payoff-irrelevant once the actual choice
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was faced). The key second black card was randomly selected among the remaining
cards.
3.2 Choices and Errors
In spite of the simplicity of the task, the mean error rate across participants was 28.93%,
with a median of 31.25% (SD = 18.21, min 0.63%, max 60.00%). We start by examining
the dependence of error rates on both economic and numerical distance. Figure 3 plots
the frequency of “stay” decisions (choosing the same deck as in the first decision) for
each possible value of each variable. The left-hand side panel plots the dependence on
economic distance, i.e. differences in expected values. The red shaded areas correspond
to errors, as a rational decision maker should stay for a positive expected value difference
and switch for a negative one. To facilitate the comparison, in all figures and regressions
the economic and numerical distances are both normalized to be between 0 and 1.3
Clearly, the probability to stay with the same deck stands in a clear positive relation
with the difference in expected values. The frequency of errors becomes smaller as the
difference becomes larger (no matter the sign), and it is largest (essentially 1/2) when
the difference approaches zero. This pattern is radically different from that predicted by
neoclassical economic theory. Even accounting for noise, neoclassical predictions would
prescribe choice frequencies with a flat slope somewhere above zero for negative values
of the expected value difference (where stay is an error), and a flat slope somewhere
below one for positive values (for which stay is the correct option). This is clearly not
the case. Subjects gradually make less errors as the objective economic distance between
the options becomes larger.
In contrast, the right-hand panel depicts the relation between choice frequency and
the numerical difference between the values of the (first) black card and the red card.
Again, shaded areas correspond to errors, since the correct decision is to stay when
the first black card was strictly smaller than the red one, and switch otherwise. The
gradual relation is essentially absent in this case (with slopes being relatively flat), and
there is a clear discontinuity at zero (the normative switching point). That is, subjects
on average understood the task, but the numerical distance between card values does
not appear to play a large role. The comparison between the panels suggests that the
variability in responses arises mainly from differences in expected values, and not from
purely numerical differences.
Figure 4 further investigates the relative contribution of the two dimensions of choice
difficulty by letting one variable vary while keeping the other fixed (which is made pos-
sible by our design). In the left-hand panel, we plot choice frequencies as a function
of expected value differences, separately for trials where the numerical distances corre-
3For all figures, unless otherwise specified, each point represents each distinct value of the variable in
the x-axis and the corresponding average value of the variable in the y-axis (choice frequencies or average
response times). Therefore each point is an average across potentially different subjects and trials. The
depicted curves are estimated using a fractional regression with a polynomial of second degree.
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Figure 3: Experiment 1. Stay choices as function of expected value difference between
staying and switching the deck (left-hand panel), and as function of the numerical dis-
tance (black minus red; right-hand panel). Gray areas indicate 95% binomial proportion
confidence intervals.
spond to three particular, fixed values (1, 2, or 3, corresponding to 0.1, 0.4, and 0.7
after normalization). The positive relation between the proportion of stay choices and
expected value difference is essentially unchanged, with the depicted curves essentially
overlapping. In contrast, the right-hand panel plots choice frequencies as a function of
numerical distances, separately for trials where the expected value differences correspond
to three particular, fixed values (1/90, 2/90, or 3/90, again corresponding to 0.1, 0.4, and
0.7 after normalization). The relation changes drastically for different expected value
differences, uncovering a negative, monotonic, and gradual relation between the pro-
portion of stay choices and the numerical difference between the stimuli which becomes
stronger for larger expected value differences. The figure suggests again that expected
value differences are the determinant factor (gradually) influencing error rates, but also
that, when keeping the economic dimension of choice difficulty fixed, second-order effects
appear which are compatible with common findings from the perceptual literature.
We now turn to a regression analysis. The data form a strongly balanced panel with
160 trials for each of the 93 participants. Table 1 shows random-effects Probit regressions
where the dependent variable is 1 in case of a correct answer.4 Model 1 establishes the
basic effect, namely that larger (objective) economic distances lead to less errors. Model
2 introduces the numerical distance and shows that this variable also leads to lower error
rates, revealing perceptual effects on top of value-induced ones.5 Since both distances are
normalized, we can compare the magnitude of the two effects. The regression coefficients
for economic distance range from 1.2 to 1.6, and the regression coefficients for numerical
distance range from 0.36 to 0.58. We can also calculate the relative elasticity of the two
variables. A percentage variation in the economic distance predicts an average increase
4Using a fixed effects regression instead does not affect the main results, showing that these results
are not determined by heterogeneity among subjects. The same comment applies to all other panel
regressions below.
5The results are unchanged if we define the numerical distance through the log of the numerical values
of the cards, as suggested by Moyer and Landauer (1967).
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Figure 4: Experiment 1. Left-hand panel: Stay choices as a function of expected value
differences for various, fixed numerical distances. Right-hand panel: Stay choices as a
function of numerical distance for various, fixed expected value differences. The 95%
binomial proportion confidence intervals are plotted.
of 21.84% in the probability of a correct answer, while a percentage variation in the
numerical distance predicts an average increase of only 5.40% in the probability of a
correct answer. This provides further evidence for the predominant role of the economic
dimension of choice difficulty over the perceptual.
As Figure 4 illustrates, our design allows to examine trials with identical expected
value differences but different numerical distances, and vice versa. However, a purely me-
chanical effect prevents both variables from being fully orthogonal, as a larger numerical
distance between the cards allows a larger number of feasible values of economic distance
(the Spearman correlation between numerical and economic distances across the set of
decisions is ρ = −0.6491, N = 160, p < 0.001). Hence, in Model 3, we introduce the
interaction between the two dimensions of choice difficulty as a control. The coefficient
is significant and negative, reflecting the mechanical relation in the dimensions across
the entire dataset. However, the main effects are unaffected by this control.
Last, Model 4 adds a number of other controls: gender, native language, left-
handedness, and cumulated earnings (Sum Won). The regression shows that the main
effects are robust. Females (54) make more errors than males, as can be confirmed by
a direct, non-parametric test (females 33.08%, males 23.19%; Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
test, N = 93, z = 2.764, p = 0.0068). Native speakers (72) make less errors than other
participants (natives 25.89%, others 39.35; MWW test, N = 93, z = 3.116, p = 0.0018).
Also, participants who earned more in previous trials are more likely to make a correct
choice, which is merely an indication of heterogeneous skills among participants. In all
regression models, we control also for learning effects (round, 1 to 160) and find that the
probability of making an error decreases over time.
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Table 1: Experiment 1. Random-effects Probit regressions on correct answers.
Correct Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Econ. Dist. 1.229∗∗∗ 1.447∗∗∗ 1.622∗∗∗ 1.620∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.107) (0.140) (0.141)
Num. Dist. 0.362∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.094) (0.093)
Econ. Dist. × Num. Dist. −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Sum Won 0.011∗
(0.006)
Female −0.438∗∗∗
(0.141)
Native 0.462∗∗∗
(0.169)
Age −0.045∗∗∗
(0.010)
Left handed 0.378∗∗
(0.194)
Round −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.007∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Constant 0.233∗∗ 0.003 −0.061 0.886∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.096) (0.103) (0.284)
Log L. −7358.011 −7337.550 −7329.264 −7265.955
Wald test 163.304∗∗∗ 191.995∗∗∗ 188.653∗∗∗ 251.391∗∗∗
Obs. 14880 14880 14880 14880
Robust standard errors in brackets, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.3 Response Times and the Underlying Processes
As an additional, independent test of the cardinal effects of economic distance, we mea-
sured response times for all decisions. The key response time for our purposes is the one
of the second decision within each trial. Other response times, however, can be used
to control for individual differences in (mechanical) swiftness, e.g. as arising from the
relative ease of interface use. For the second decision, we computed individual average
response times. The average of those across individuals was 1.612 seconds (SD = 0.648,
median 1.560, min = 0.272, max = 3.797).
The left-hand panel of Figure 5 plots average response times as a function of the
expected value difference between stay and switch. There is clear evidence of gradual
effects as postulated in psychophysics. An inverted U-shape is apparent, indicating a
negative relation between response times and the distance in expected values between
stay and switch.6 Choices closer to indifference (zero expected value difference) are as-
6A random-effects regression verifies the significance of the curvature. The coefficient of the squared
expected value difference is significantly negative (Coef. −0.169, z = −7.97, p < 0.001).
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Figure 5: Average response times as a function of expected value difference (left-hand
panel) and as a function of numerical distance (right-hand panel).
sociated with the longest response times. In contrast, the right-hand panel of Figure 5,
which depicts the relation between response times and numerical differences, shows an
essentially flat trend. That is, unlike in the case of expected value differences, there is
no discernible pattern. In summary, response times suggest a gradual effect of (objec-
tive) economic distance (but not of numerical distance), confirming that the postulated
relationship goes beyond a simple as if story and reflects actual decision processes.
We now turn to a regression analysis. Response times are a noisy variable, usually
presenting a skewed, non-normal distribution and rare extreme observations. To account
for these features it is common practice to take the logarithm of response times as
the variable of interest in regression analyses (Fischbacher, Hertwig and Bruhin, 2013;
Achtziger and Alo´s-Ferrer, 2014). Table 2 reports random-effects regressions of log-
transformed response times, taking advantage of the panel structure of the data. To
control for individual differences in mechanical swiftness, we use the log-transformed
response time for the non-rewarded, first black card (RT1) and the log-transformed
response time for pressing a space bar, which was required before the start of each trial
(RT0). Model 1 establishes the basic effect, namely that responses are faster for larger
(objective) economic distances, confirming that the phenomena we study reflect basic
properties of actual decision processes. Model 2 adds numerical distance. The coefficient
is also significantly negative, although of a smaller magnitude (recall that both variables
are normalized to have the same range). This shows that, in spite of the relatively
flat shape of the aggregate relation as depicted in Figure 5, response times are also
influenced by numerical differences, at least as a second-order determinant. As in the
case of choice frequencies, Model 3 shows that the effects are robust to controlling for
the interaction between the two distances. Finally, Model 4 shows that the results are
robust to additional controls. Gender and cumulated earnings did not affect response
times, but native speakers took longer to respond than other participants.
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Table 2: Experiment 1. Random-effects regressions on log response times.
Log RT Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Econ. Dist. −0.174∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.031) (0.035) (0.035)
Num. Dist. −0.106∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.038) (0.039)
Econ. Dist. × Num. Dist. 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Sum Won 0.008
(0.006)
Female −0.056
(0.078)
Native 0.281∗∗∗
(0.119)
Age −0.014
(0.009)
Left handed −0.014
(0.191)
Round −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
RT0 0.167∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.037)
RT1 0.126∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032)
Constant 0.644∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.055) (0.057) (0.253)
R2 overall 0.108 0.109 0.110 0.130
Wald test 219.477∗∗∗ 220.200∗∗∗ 257.260∗∗∗ 259.572∗∗∗
Obs. 14880 14880 14880 14880
Robust standard errors in brackets, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.4 Discussion of Experiment 1
The first experiment is probably as close as one can get to pure psychophysics in the
economics domain. By using a gambling task with objectively correct answers, we can
commit to the exact values of the explanatory variable before running the experiment;
that is, we can rely on expected value differences and no utility estimation is needed.
Still, the task is representative of the judgment and decision-making domain and remains
intrinsically interesting for economic decision making. We find a robust gradual relation
between cardinal, objective economic distance, as captured by expected value differences,
and error rates. Error rates gradually decrease as the distance between alternatives
becomes larger (decisions become easier). We also find that purely numerical effects
(by how much a number is larger than another one, even if the comparison is payoff-
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irrelevant) do influence error rates as predicted by psychophysical studies, but this is a
second-order effect and the main explanatory variable remains economic distance.
Response times confirm the gradual relationship. As predicted by psychophysics,
easier decisions (in the sense reflected by objective economic distance) are faster. This
is important, because response times are a direct reflection of the underlying decision
processes. Hence the relationship further confirms that the gradual effects of choice
difficulty do reflect actual decision processes and not just a characteristic of how the
statistical model of errors fits the data.
4 Experiment 2: Subjective Domain
Experiment 1 can be seen as a streamlined proof of concept which does away with the
problems inherent in utility estimation. In Experiment 2, we parsimoniously go one
step further by reproducing the analysis for more complex decisions under risk where
what is “correct” depends on the individual risk attitude, and hence utility estimation
is unavoidable. In this sense, Experiment 2 studies choices in the subjective domain,
while Experiment 1 belonged to the objective domain. Crucially, to avoid the problems
pointed out in the Introduction, we will strictly adhere to an out-of-sample approach
where the utility used to test the gradual dependencies in the data is always estimated
from a different part of the dataset. This ensures that the estimation allows us to test
for the presence of gradual effects, instead of artificially creating them.
As in Experiment 1, we focus on error rates. We will have three (explanatory)
variables of interest in sight. Of course, we will focus on expected utility as just described.
Additionally, in this experiment we can examine the differences between expected value
and expected utility differences as determinants of gradual effects on error rates. For
completeness, we will also examine the potential effects of (payoff-irrelevant) numerical
distance. Last, and again as a confirmatory exercise, we will examine the effects of those
variables on response times.
4.1 Design and Procedures
Implementation, procedures, and data collection were as in Experiment 1. Participants
were N = 96 (different) university students (66 females, age range 18 − 36, mean 24).
Sessions lasted around 60 minutes and the average payoff was EUR 13.45 (around USD
14.40 at the time of the experiment). Three participants were unable to understand the
task and were excluded from the analysis.
The experimental task is as follows. Participants are confronted with two decks
of cards, a red one (Diamonds) and a black one (Clubs), containing ten cards each
(numbered 1 to 10). At the beginning of each of the 170 trials, two cards are extracted
from the black deck and displayed, one red card is extracted from the red deck, and a
monetary prize is displayed (see Figure 6). The participants’ task is to decide whether
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Figure 6: Experiment 2. Each trial starts by extracting two black cards, a red card, and
displaying a prize. Participants then decide whether to bet or not, knowing that betting
is costly. If the participant bets, a black card is extracted, and the participant wins if
and only if the extracted black card is strictly larger than the red card.
to bet or to pass. After this decision, a further black card will be extracted from
the remaining eight cards in the black deck, and the objective is to beat the red card
with that new card. Betting is costly: placing a bet costs EUR 0.10 (fixed for all
trials), independently of the outcome of the trial. If the participant bets and if the
newly-extracted black card is strictly larger than the displayed red card, the participant
receives the displayed monetary prize (minus the cost). Otherwise, the payment is zero
(resulting in a net loss equal to the cost of betting). If the participant does not bet, there
is neither a payment nor a cost, and the experiment moves to the next trial. Before a
new trial starts, all cards are returned to their respective decks and those are reshuﬄed.
Hence, each trial reflects an independent decision situation.
The set of initial stimuli (red card, first two black cards, and prize) was predetermined
and pseudorandomized across trials to achieve adequate stimuli variance. The crucial
third black card was randomly selected among the cards remaining in the deck. Red
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cards were extracted in such a way that there was always some probability of winning,
so as to avoid trivial decisions. Hence, there were eight possible distinct probabilities
of winning, ranging from 12.5% to a sure win. Prizes ranged from 10 to 120 cents, and
were determined trial-by-trial as deviations from the actuarially-fair prize, the amount
that leaves a risk-neutral agent indifferent between betting and passing. Eleven different
distortions from the fair prize were implemented, ranging from 50% below to 50% above,
in 10% steps.
In each trial, at the moment of the decision, the black deck contains eight cards,
and the two already-extracted cards are displayed. The probability to win when betting
depends on the magnitude of the red card and on whether the displayed black cards
are winning or losing cards. In the example depicted in Figure 6, the red card is an 8
and the two extracted black cards are a 2 and a 4, hence both are losing cards. That
is, the black deck contains two winning cards and six losing ones, yielding a probability
of winning of 1/4. Since the cost of betting is 10 cents, the actuarially-fair prize is 40
cents, but the offered prize is 24 cents. Hence, a risk-averse or risk-neutral agent should
decline to bet, while a risk-loving one might rationally decide to bet. That is, there are
no objectively-correct decisions in this task; rather, what is “correct” depends on the
individual risk attitude. Therefore, we hypothesized that the natural measure of choice
difficulty or subjective economic distance would be the difference between the expected
utilities of betting and passing, referred to as EU distance for clarity, which requires us
to estimate the underlying individual utilities of money.
By design, however, the expected value of betting depends on the distortion of the
fair prize. For risk neutral individuals, the difference in expected value between passing
and betting reflects how far away from “indifference” the participants were, and are
hence a natural, alternative measure for “strength of preference.” Therefore, another
candidate determinant of gradual effects is simply the absolute value of the expected
value differences between betting and passing, which we refer to as EV distance. In
contrast to Experiment 1, the comparison between these two measures of economic
distance is informative of which is the relevant measure of strength of preference in this
context.
We remark also that the probability of winning does not depend on the numerical
distances between the black cards and the red one, but only on whether the former are
larger or smaller than the latter. Hence, numerical distances in themselves are payoff-
irrelevant (but the sign of the numerical differences is not). Analogously to Experiment
1, this allows us to disentangle the numerical closeness of stimuli as a further possible
dimension of choice difficulty, which is the closest one to standard measures of perceptual
similarity used in psychophysics. Since there are two black cards, we have different pos-
sible candidates for numerical distance. We present here the analysis using the distance
between the red card and the second, most recent black card, since a large literature
has advocated the prominence of the recency effect (Deese and Kaufman, 1957; Mur-
dock Jr., 1962). We also carried out analyses with other definitions of numerical distance;
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the main results described below are unaffected.7 There are ten possible perceived dis-
tances between the red card and the second black card, ranging from 0 to 9. We refer
to this magnitude as Numerical distance.
4.2 Utility Estimation
We estimate out-of-sample risk attitudes for each subject. Specifically, we use the choices
made in odd trials to estimate risk attitudes and use this estimation to predict the ex-
pected utility in the even trials, and vice versa.8 To derive individual risk attitudes we
rely on the estimation of random parameters (Loomes and Sugden, 1995, 1998) using
Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) (see, e.g., Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden, 2002;
Moffatt, 2005; Bellemare, Kro¨ger and van Soest, 2008). Specifically, we adapt the esti-
mation procedure described by Harrison (2008) and Moffatt (2015). The MSL technique
is frequently used in the context of decision-making under risk (e.g., Von Gaudecker,
Van Soest and Wengstro¨m, 2011; Conte, Hey and Moffatt, 2011; Wilcox, 2011; Moffatt,
Sitzia and Zizzo, 2015). This approach allows us to estimate risk aversion (r) as a deter-
ministic coefficient, but allowing for sampling error. An alternative interpretation of the
procedure is that there is heterogeneity in preferences of subjects, hence r is better char-
acterized as a distribution instead of a point estimate. For computational tractability,
we assume that r follows a normal distribution in our dataset.9
As the functional form of the utility, we adopt a normalized CARA function as in
Conte, Hey and Moffatt (2011), i.e.
U(x) =


1−exp(−rx)
1−exp(−rxmax)
, if r 6= 0
x
xmax
, if r = 0
where xmax is the upper limit of the outcome variable x. Using a CARA utility function
offers the advantage to fully accommodate zero outcomes, while at the same time it
assumes away the impact of initial wealth. However, the results are robust to the use of
CRRA functions.
The estimated risk propensities in our dataset have an average µˆr = 0.054 (SD
= 0.025, median = 0.046, min = 0.024, max = 0.163). The risk propensity estimated on
7The considered alternatives were the distance between the highest black card and the red one, the
distance between the average of the two black cards and the red card, and the distance between the
highest or lowest black card and the red one, as well as controlling for the log transformation of the
numbers.
8Our results do not change if we use different out-of-sample approaches, as e.g. using an initial block
of observations for the estimation and predict the expected utility out of sample for the remaining trials.
9Classical methods based on an individual estimation of individual risk attitudes via maximum like-
lihood procedures avoid the distributional assumptions made by random parameter methods. However,
Monte Carlo analysis shows that, with finite samples, the out-of-sample predictive performance of ran-
dom utility models can be misleading when individual estimation is employed (Wilcox, 2011). Moreover,
Apestegu´ıa, Ballester and Lu (2017) have pointed out that random utility models, in the context of risk
and time preferences, can violate choice monotonicity compared to natural parameterizations. Further,
these works indicate that alternatives such as the random parameters methods we use, where utilities
are parametric but the parameters are random, are immune to these difficulties.
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odd trials (µˆr = 0.054) is not significantly different from the one estimated on even trials
(µˆr = 0.053; Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, N = 93, z = −0.404, p = 0.6860). The absence
of negative values in both estimations shows that no subject is classified as risk-loving,
while some subjects display values of r close to 0, indicating risk neutrality. However,
the majority of subjects are estimated to be risk averse.
For the simulation reported in Figure 1, we generated a dataset where each of 93
fictitious subjects randomly chose 170 times between accepting certain bets or not (the
dataset mimics the basic features of Experiment 2). Bets involved a certain probability
of a positive prize, and led to the loss of a small amount of money with the remaining
probability. The outside option always yielded zero payoffs. Prizes and probabilities
changed across trials, but the amount potentially lost was fixed. The set of bets was
such that a risk-neutral subject would accept half of the times. “Decisions” were fully
random and unrelated to the options. The right-hand panel of Figure 1 corresponds to
an estimation performed exactly as described above for Experiment 2. The left-hand
panel depicts the results of an estimation using the same CARA functional form, but
with a standard within-sample approach as common in the literature. Specifically, we
implemented MSL assuming heteroskedastic Fechner errors (Fechner, 1860; Hey and
Orme, 1994). We used the estimated risk attitudes to compute, within sample, the
expected utility difference between the two options (betting minus passing), and then
plotted this difference against the proportion of times one option was chosen over the
other. As argued in the introduction, the difference between both approaches shows that
the estimation procedure might create apparent gradual effects simply because they are
assumed in the underlying random utility model. Our out-of-sample procedure ensures
that the regularities we uncover correspond to actual features of the data.
4.3 Choices and Errors
We define an error as a choice which gives a negative expected utility, e.g. deciding to bet
when the expected utility (as estimated out of sample) of betting is strictly smaller than
the expected utility of passing. The mean error rate across participants was 22.71%,
with a median of 20.00% (SD = 10.77, max 51.76%, min 5.29%). Figure 7 plots the
frequency of betting decisions for each possible value of each variable. As in previous
pictures, to facilitate the comparison, in all figures and regressions the various distances
are normalized to be between 0 and 1. The upper panel plots the dependence on expected
utility differences. The shaded areas correspond to errors with the definition above. We
observe that the relation between betting frequency and expected utility differences
has a sigmoidal shape resembling a cumulative normal distribution or a logistic curve.
This shape indicates that error rates decrease gradually as the difference in expected
utilities between the options becomes larger. For very large differences, error rates are
close to zero. For differences close to zero, choice is essentially random (error rates
close to 50%). Of course, this stands in sharp contrast to deterministic, neoclassical
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Figure 7: Experiment 2. Proportion of betting decisions as a function of expected utility
differences (upper panel), expected value differences (lower left-hand panel), and numer-
ical differences (lower right-hand panel). Gray areas indicate 95% binomial proportion
confidence intervals. Shaded areas indicate the proportion of errors.
models, which would predict that subjects always bet when expected utility differences
are positive and always pass when they are negative.
The lower left-hand panel plots the proportion of betting choices as a function of
the differences in expected value (betting minus passing). We observe a positive but
non-monotonic trend with greater expected values corresponding roughly to a higher
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frequency of betting.10 This is not surprising, since as long as utility is increasing
on monetary amounts, there will be some positive correlation between expected utility
and expected values in a dataset. However, the figure strongly suggests that expected
utility differences better explain gradual effects on error rates that differences in expected
values.
Last, the lower right-hand panel plots the proportion of betting decisions as a function
of numerical distances as defined above. We do not include a depiction of errors as those
cannot be derived from numerical distance alone in this experiment. The picture suggests
a weak, noisy monotonic relation which might hint to second-order effects but offers no
strong evidence of an impact of purely numerical, payoff-irrelevant perceptions on choice
frequencies. In summary, our data shows that, as in Experiment 1, there is a gradual
relation between economic distance and error rates, but the former now corresponds to
differences in expected utilities.
We now turn to a regression analysis. The data form a strongly balanced panel with
170 trials for each of the 93 participants. We ran random-effects panel Probit regressions
where the dependent variable is 1 in case of a correct answer. For completeness, we
provide separate analyses for expected utility (Table 3) and expected value differences
(Table 4), while controlling for numerical distance in both. Recall that Expected Utility
distance (EU distance), Expected Value distance (EV distance), and numerical distance
are all normalized to range from 0 to 1. The various regression models are built in
a completely analogous way, and hence we discuss them simultaneously. Note that the
definitions of errors is the natural one in each table, i.e. choices which go against expected
utility differences in Table 3 and choices which go against expected value differences in
Table 4.
In Model 1 of both tables we see that larger economic distances lead to less errors,
confirming the basic prediction. However, there is a considerable difference in the mag-
nitude of the estimated coefficients, with EU distance having a coefficient almost 20
times bigger than EV distance. To conduct a proper comparison, we calculated the
relative elasticities. A percentage variation in EU distance increases the probability of a
correct answer by an average of 20.73%, while the analogous percentage for EV distance
increases is only 11.98%. This confirms the message from Figure 7 that differences in
expected utility, and not in expected value, are the relevant dimension of strength of
preference in this context.
Model 2 in both tables introduces numerical distance as an additional control (recall
the lower right-hand panel of Figure 7). In the presence of EU distance, numerical simi-
larity between stimuli decreases the probability of a correct answer. The effect becomes
marginally significant when controlling for the interaction between numerical distance
and EU distance (Model 3), and loses significance when adding further controls (Model
10Errors in this panel are defined as decisions which contradict expected value differences. According
to this risk-neutral definition, the mean error rate across participants was 36.29%, with a median of
36.47% (SD = 6.60, min 19.41%, max 54.12%).
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Table 3: Experiment 2. Random-effects Probit regressions on correct answers for EU
distance. Correct answer is defined as passing when EU ≤ 0 and betting when EU ≥ 0.
Correct Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
EU Dist. 8.538∗∗∗ 8.836∗∗∗ 10.146∗∗∗ 10.146∗∗∗
(0.526) (0.544) (0.841) (0.838)
Num. Dist. −0.391∗∗∗ −0.154∗ −0.154
(0.049) (0.088) (0.088)
Num. Dist. × EU Dist. −3.244∗∗∗ −3.251∗∗∗
(1.065) (1.065)
Sum Won −0.000
(0.000)
Female −0.015
(0.072)
Native 0.031
(0.086)
Age 0.027∗∗∗
(0.009)
Left handed −0.109
(0.133)
Round 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.105∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ −0.326
(0.045) (0.050) (0.058) (0.378)
Log L. -7414 -7382 -7376 -7372
Wald test 281.961∗∗∗ 321.685∗∗∗ 310.504∗∗∗ 385.590∗∗∗
Obs. 15810 15810 15810 15810
Robust standard errors in brackets,
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
4). In the presence of EV distance, numerical effects are not statistically significant.
They only become significant when we further control for the interaction between nu-
merical distance and EV distance (Model 3) as well as other controls (Model 4). The
results for numerical distance should be attributed to the fact that there is a correlation
between the expected value and numerical distance across all decisions in the dataset
(Spearman’s ρ = 0.1453; N = 170, p = 0.0587), but there is no correlation between
numerical distance and expected utility (Spearman’s ρ = 0.098, N = 170, p = 0.2050).
In all models we further control for learning effects. Participants appear to improve
with repetition when errors are defined according to expected values, but not when they
are defined according to expected utilities. There are no gender differences in errors
defined according to EU distance, as confirmed by a non-parametric test (females 22.41%,
males 23.46%; MWW test, N = 93, z = 0.432, p = 0.6654). Likewise, native speakers
(77) did not perform significantly differently from other participants (natives 22.29%,
others 19.41%; MWW test, N = 93, z = 0.647, p = 0.5179). When defining errors
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Table 4: Experiment 2. Random-effects Probit regressions on correct answers for EV
distance. Correct answer is defined as passing when EV ≤ 0 and betting when EV ≥ 0.
Correct Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
EV Dist. 0.463∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.069) (0.070)
Num. Dist. −0.013 0.628∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.061) (0.062)
Num. Dist × EV Dist. −1.552∗∗∗ −1.600∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.124)
Sum Won −0.000
(0.000)
Female −0.086∗∗
(0.041)
Native 0.096∗
(0.054)
Age −0.003
(0.005)
Left handed −0.001
(0.070)
Round 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −0.011 −0.006 −0.285∗∗∗ −0.159
(0.021) (0.025) (0.035) (0.258)
Log L. -10170 -10170 -10102 -10037
Wald test 223.538∗∗∗ 223.868∗∗∗ 453.437∗∗∗ 466.95∗∗∗
Obs. 15810 15810 15810 15810
Robust standard errors in brackets,
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
according to expected values, females did behave differently (males 37.22%, females
33.91%; MWW test, N = 93, z = 2.399, p = 0.0164), as did native speakers (natives
35.68%, others 39.26%; MWW test, N = 93, z = −1.874, p = 0.0609).
4.4 Response Times and the Underlying Processes
The previous section shows that differences in expected utilities are the best candidate as
an explanatory determinant of gradual effects on errors. Expected value differences and
numerical differences also display significant effects, but those are of a smaller magnitude
and appear less robust. In this section, we further compare the gradual effects of all three
variables by focusing on response times. The main objective is to show that, while there
appears to be a strong, clear correspondence between expected utility differences and
actual human decision processes as reflected by response times, that relation is far from
clear when it comes to other alternative variables.
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The variable of interest is the time participants took to decide whether to bet or
to pass. The average across individual average response times for this decision was
2.918 seconds (SD = 1.140, median = 2.687, min = 1.140, max = 7.527). Figure 8
plots average response times as a function of expected utility differences (upper panel),
of expected value differences (lower left-hand panel), and numerical distances (lower
right-hand panel). Response times and EU distance clearly show an inverted U-shaped
relation. Harder decisions, resulting in longer response times, are those corresponding
to smaller expected utility differences. However, the figure shows no systematic relation
with EV differences11 or with numerical distance. This provides an independent confir-
mation that a larger strength of preference, in the sense of larger subjective economic
distance, can be linked to easier decisions.
As for Experiment 1, we conducted a panel regression analysis for log-transformed
response times. Tables 5 and 6 report the corresponding regressions using expected
utility distances and expected value distances as a measure of strength of preference,
respectively. To control for individual differences in mechanical swiftness, the variable
RT0 measures the log of the response time for pressing the space bar to move to the
next trial.
Response times are significantly shorter for larger EU distances across all models in
Table 5. This fundamental effect is robust to controlling for numerical distance, accu-
mulated earnings, gender, native language, and other controls. Additionally, numerical
distance does have an effect on response times, validating the view from psychophysics
(Moyer and Landauer, 1967; Dehaene, Dupoux and Mehler, 1990) that even payoff-
irrelevant perceptual differences might influence actual choice difficulty. That is, in
addition to the effects of subjective economic distance, response times are shorter for
more perceptually distinguishable stimuli (larger numerical distance).
In contrast, the effect of expected value differences is less clear. In Model 1 of
Table 6, we observe larger response times for higher values of EV distance, contrary
to expectations if EV distance was taken to explain the gradual effects of strength of
preference. However, the effect becomes non-significant when we control for the relation
between EV distance and numerical distance as well as other controls (Models 3 and 4).
Again, the analysis is consistent with the view that expected utility differences are the
key variable explaining the gradual effects that we investigate.
In all models we control for time trends, reproducing the standard observation that
subjects become slightly faster over time. Other controls deliver no additional insights,
except that left-handed subjects took longer than right-handed ones.
11The coefficient of the squared expected utility difference is significantly negative in a random-effects
regression, coef. = −0.090, z = −2.27, p = 0.023. The corresponding coefficient for expected value
differences is not significantly different from zero, coef. = 0.012, z = 0.85, p = 0.393.
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Figure 8: Experiment 2. Average response times on EU Difference (top panel), EV
difference (lower left-hand panel), and numerical distance (lower right-hand panel). Gray
areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.
4.5 Discussion of Experiment 2
The second experiment considers standard economic decisions under risk (betting), which
are an example of preferential choice where there is no objectively correct alternative.
Contrary to the first experiment, the appropriate dimension explaining gradual effects
on error rates needs to be estimated from the data. Our evidence shows that expected
utility, and not expected value, is the appropriate integrated variable capturing strength
of preference. Choices with a larger expected utility difference between the alternatives
result in lower error rates and shorter response times. The effects are robust and obtain
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Table 5: Experiment 2. Random-effects regressions on log response times, EU distance.
Log RT Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
EU Dist. −1.082∗∗∗ −1.046∗∗∗ −1.255∗∗∗ −1.256∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.182) (0.219) (0.219)
Num. Dist. −0.106∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.024) (0.024)
Num. Dist × EU Dist. 0.500∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.024)
Sum Won 0.000
(0.000)
Female 0.024
(0.081)
Native 0.083
(0.114)
Age −0.011
(0.011)
Left handed 0.226∗∗∗
(0.082)
Round −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RT0 0.199∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Constant 1.351∗∗∗ 1.393∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗ 1.402∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.310)
R2 overall 0.149 0.151 0.152 0.170
Wald test 562.099∗∗∗ 686.636∗∗∗ 708.797∗∗∗ 735.330∗∗∗
Obs. 15810 15810 15810 15810
Robust standard errors in brackets,
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
even though we use a strictly out-of-sample approach, that is, they are not an artifice of
the estimation method. Further, the link to response times shows that the relationship
between expected utility differences and choice difficulty reflects the characteristics of
actual decision processes, rather than being just “as if” modeling.
Numerical distance, seen as a more perceptual dimension of choice difficulty, plays a
minor role. The effects on error rates are small and not robust to the addition of controls.
Response times suggest that a second-order effect is actually present, but expected utility
differences are the major determinant of the effects we study.
5 Discussion
Homo oeconomicus does not play dice (but homo sapiens might). A fully rational eco-
nomic agent would be consistent, choosing an option 100% of the time if it delivered
a slightly larger payoff than the alternative, and 0% if a minute payoff reduction left
it worse than the alternative. However, considerable evidence suggests that the imple-
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Table 6: Experiment 2. Random-effects regressions on log response times, EV distance.
Log RT Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
EV Dist. 0.054∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.009 0.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023)
Num. Dist −0.149∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.024) (0.024)
Num. Dist. × EV Dist. 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145
(0.044) (0.043)
Sum Won 0.000
(0.000)
Female 0.011
(0.083)
Native 0.073
(0.116)
Age −0.009
(0.010)
Left handed 0.221∗∗
(0.091)
Round −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RT0 0.194∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Constant 1.231∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗∗ 1.315∗∗∗ 1.290∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.310)
R2 overall 0.132 0.136 0.136 0.154
Wald test 472.772∗∗∗ 607.972∗∗∗ 665.532∗∗∗ 687.710∗∗∗
Obs. 15810 15810 15810 15810
Robust standard errors in brackets,
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
mentation of decision processes in the human brain follows processes of a more gradual
nature (e.g., Shadlen and Kiani, 2013). We have demonstrated the existence of a stable,
gradual relation between error rates and an underlying, cardinal “strength of preference,”
and shown that the latter is best represented by integrated variables of an exclusively
economic nature. That is, decisions become more error-prone as the economic distance
between the alternatives becomes smaller.
Our research strategy has followed three complementary approaches. First, we
have shown that, in decisions in the domain of judgment and decision making where
objectively-correct options can be identified, expected value differences are enough to
explain error rates. This is important, because such an explanatory variable is indepen-
dent of any estimation of subjective values and hence constitutes the direct parallel to
psychophysical studies which have identified gradual effects as a function of objective
differences in weight, length, brightness, etc. The typical candidate explanatory variable
derived from purely psychophysical approaches for economic tasks, (payoff-irrelevant)
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numerical differences (Moyer and Landauer, 1967; Dehaene, Dupoux and Mehler, 1990),
does play a role but can be safely considered a second-order variable.
Second, we have shown that, in decisions under risk in the subjective domain, where
what is correct depends on individual risk attitudes, strength of preference can be charac-
terized by an integrated variable reflecting differences in expected utility, while expected
value differences do a considerably worse job. Again, numerical differences do play a
role, but appear to be relatively less important than pure economic distance. Crucially,
our approach has followed a strictly out-of-sample procedure where utility functions are
estimated on one part of the dataset and the test of gradual effects between utility dif-
ferences and error rates is conducted using the choices in a different part of the dataset.
This is important, because fitting a dataset with, say, a random utility model merely
assumes that errors follow a smooth distribution; that is, gradual effects are assumed
and would appear to be present after the fact even if they did not exist at all.
Third, we have shown that the relation between strength of preference, as captured
by notions of economic distance, and error rates reflects more than an ex post and as
if model. The same gradual effects are obtained when examining response times, with
easier decisions (those where economic distance is large) being made faster than harder
ones (those where economic distance is small). Response times are a straightforward,
easily-measurable reflection of the actual functioning of human decision processes. Most
importantly, they are unrelated to estimation and fitting procedures and hence serve as
an independent confirmation of the postulated effects.
Our results provide empirical support and explicit foundation for the literature on
stochastic choice, which has been long advocated as a realistic building block for theories
of microeconomic decision making (Debreu, 1958; Davidson and Marschak, 1959; Luce,
1959; Machina, 1985). It is in line with modern empirical contributions pointing out the
ubiquitousness of stochastic choice and decision inconsistencies (Camerer, 1989; Hey and
Orme, 1994; Agranov and Ortoleva, 2017), but goes beyond those by precisely examining
the content of elusive concepts as “strength of preference” and “choice difficulty” and
isolating them from possibly-artificial phenomena derived, e.g., from the underlying
assumptions of models used to estimate noisy utility.
The analysis is broadly in line with the psychophysics and neuroscience literature,
where the presence of gradual effects on decision making is regarded as an elementary,
firmly-established fact (e.g., Weber’s Law), but goes beyond it by showing that economic
distance is not as simple as objectively-measurable weight or length. Economic decisions
are decisions, and hence it is unsurprising that the same (neural) mechanisms that
determine perception-based judgments also play a role in them. However, economic
decisions are complex decisions, and it is equally unsurprising that simple applications
of psychophysics (as, say, taking only numerical magnitudes into account) fall short of
the task of accounting for economic errors.
Conceptually, our results agree with earlier studies as Mosteller and Nogee (1951)
and with recent contributions as Khaw, Li and Woodford (2018). Both report grad-
31
ual increases in the proportion of risky choices in lottery experiments as the reward
increases. Khaw, Li and Woodford (2018) argue in terms of an imprecise perception of
stimuli (Green and Swets, 1966; Ma et al., 2006). Those are payoff-relevant numerical
magnitudes and hence aligned with economic distance as we consider it.
It is also important to remark that the sigmoidal relation between economic distance
and choice frequencies arises spontaneously from the data, hence providing empirical
support for random utility models as typically used in applied microeconomics, which
often employ logit or probit error distributions. By taking a step back from fitting
approaches, our analysis highlights the presence of a systematic structure of noise terms
reflecting the gradual effects of choice difficulty. This observation builds upon earlier
arguments by Hey and Orme (1994) and Harless and Camerer (1994), which attempted to
shift the focus in microeconomics away from deterministic choice models as alternatives
to expected utility theory.12
We view the relation we study here as the basic building block underlying errors
in economic decision making. A very large literature has studied heuristics and biases
in decision making (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Kahneman, 2003; Grether,
1980, and many others), which are conceived of as systematic, directional deviations
from normatively rational or consistent behavior. An equally large literature has ar-
gued that such phenomena can be explained in terms of dual-process theories including
alternative decision processes of intuitive, impulsive, or heuristic nature (Thaler and
Shefrin, 1981; Weber and Johnson, 2009; Alo´s-Ferrer and Strack, 2014, to mention just
a few), and in particular their presence has consequences for both choices and response
times. We believe that the gradual effects we describe here and dual-process theories are
complementary. Building upon the research presented here, closely-related work shows
that intuitive decision processes can be identified even when controlling for the gradual
effects described in this work. Specifically, Alo´s-Ferrer and Farolfi (2019) considers a
belief-updating task as in Grether (1980, 1992), which falls into the objective domain,
and identifies gradual effects as those seen in Experiment 1, where the explanatory
variable is exogenously given. Those effects coexist with additional decision processes
reflecting well known probability-judgment biases, namely conservatism and the rep-
resentativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010).
Analogously, Alo´s-Ferrer, Buckenmaier and Garagnani (2019) considers a lottery-choice
task, typical of decision making under risk in the subjective domain, and identifies grad-
ual effects reflecting expected utility differences following an out-of-sample approach as
in Experiment 2. Again, those effects can be seen to coexist with an additional de-
cision process reflecting the well-known certainty heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2012). In both cases, gradual effects both on
choice frequencies and response times can be identified when controlling for the can-
didate heuristics, and vice versa, demonstrating the complementarity of the approach.
12“Perhaps we should now spend some time on thinking about the noise, rather than about even more
alternatives to expected utility?” (Hey and Orme, 1994).
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Even more important, it needs to be remarked that accounting for the gradual effects
arising from economic distance is actually a precondition to be able to properly identify
heuristics and alternative decision processes in choice data. The reason is that failing to
account for such effects may bias the analysis, leading e.g. to a reverse inference fallacy
or to the attribution of patterns in error rates and response times to heuristics when
strength of preference might suffice to explain them (Krajbich et al., 2015).
The implications of our results are of broad significance for economic modeling. First,
the demonstration of the gradual relation between economic integrated variables and er-
rors provides a foundation for theories of stochastic choice and empirical approaches to
preference revelation alike. Second, the fact that these effects are a natural extension
of those observed in psychophysics provides a tangible bridge to other disciplines, most
notably neuroscience, through which new techniques and ideas can travel. Third, the
results pose a significant challenge to traditional, neoclassic modeling. For the latter is
based on deterministic and, more importantly, purely ordinal preferences. As if models
can be justified as fitting and prediction exercises, hence compatible with ordinal ap-
proaches. Our results on gradual mappings from economic variables to error rates and
response times, though, go beyond any as if interpretation, and, in our opinion, are best
viewed in the context of an inherently cardinal view of preferences.
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